SECTION II: Overview of Second-hand Investments

Year-End Secondhand Market Shows Limited Contraction Compared with Newbuildings

Overall transaction activity records only a moderate year-on-year adjustment. Total sales decline from 1,686 vessels in 2024 to 1,522 vessels in 2025, representing a reduction of ~10%, while total tonnage sold decreases from 116.5m DWT to 108.5m DWT, a decline of ~7%. Compared with the sharper contraction observed in newbuilding orders, the secondhand market shows a more contained reduction in volumes, indicating that buyer activity remains present across core segments as the year closes.

Dry Bulk

Overall activity shows only a limited year-on-year decline. Total transactions decrease from 766 vessels in 2024 to 736 vessels in 2025, a reduction of ~4%, while total traded tonnage falls from 60.2m DWT to 54.7m DWT, a decline of ~9%. The scale of the adjustment remains materially smaller than that observed in newbuilding orders.

Activity in the small and mid-sized segments records modest declines. Handysize transactions fall by ~3% in terms of vessel count and ~3% in DWT, while Supra/Ultramax activity declines by ~5% in vessels and ~4% in tonnage.

Panamax/Kamsarmax secondhand activity stood out as the only major dry bulk segment to record growth. Transactions rise from 144 vessels to 171 vessels, an increase of ~19%, while total DWT sold also increases by ~19%, from 11.4m DWT to 13.5m DWT. In the Post Panamax, activity declines marginally, down ~6% by vessel count, with traded DWT remaining broadly unchanged year-on-year.

By contrast, larger vessels experience a sharper reduction in secondhand activity. Capesize and VLOC transactions decline by ~29% in both vessel count and DWT, representing the steepest contraction across dry bulk size segments.

Taken together, secondhand dry bulk transactions show a clear concentration in smaller and mid-sized vessels, with activity levels in these segments adjusting only marginally year-on-year, while larger Capesize units account for most of the overall decline in resale volumes.

Tanker

Overall activity records only a limited decline in vessel count, while sold tonnage increases. Total transactions fall from 446 vessels in 2024 to 423 vessels in 2025, a decrease of ~5%, while total sold tonnage rises from 40.3m DWT to 43.4m DWT, an increase of ~8%, reflecting a shift toward larger average vessel sizes.

Activity declines in smaller and mid-sized segments. Small tanker transactions fall by ~34% in vessel count and ~37% in DWT, while MR activity declines by ~15% in vessels and ~12% in tonnage. These segments account for the bulk of the reduction in transaction numbers year-on-year.

By contrast, mid-to-large tanker segments record notable growth. Panamax/LR1 transactions increase by ~21% in both vessel count and DWT, while Aframax transactions rise by ~11% in vessels and ~12% in tonnage. Suezmax activity shows the strongest expansion, with transactions up by ~69% in terms of vessel count and ~68% in DWT.

VLCC secondhand activity remains almost unchanged, with vessel count down by only ~2% and sold DWT lower by ~2%, supporting the overall increase in average tanker size sold observed in 2025.

Container

Overall activity declines moderately. Total transactions fall from 205 vessels in 2024 to 190 vessels in 2025, a reduction of ~7%, while total sold tonnage declines more sharply, from 9.8m DWT to 6.9m DWT, a decrease of ~30%.

Gas Tanker

Activity contracts significantly. Transactions decline from 94 vessels in 2024 to 49 vessels in 2025, a drop of ~48%, while total traded tonnage falls from 3.8m DWT to 1.4m DWT, representing a sharper decline of 65%. The contraction in both vessel count and tonnage is resulting in a smaller contribution of gas carriers to overall secondhand market activity in 2025.

Buyer Nationality – Secondhand Purchases (Past 12 Months)

China Leads, Greece Ranks Second

China again emerges as the largest buyer in the secondhand market, with 229 vessels acquired across all segments, maintaining its leading position ahead of Greece, consistent with its ranking in newbuildings. Activity is heavily concentrated in dry bulk (158 vessels), complemented by tankers (54 units), while container and gas carrier purchases remain more limited.

Greece ranks second in secondhand acquisitions, with 179 vessels, confirming its strong presence both the newbuilding and second-hand purchases. Greek secondhand activity is led by dry bulk (109 vessels) and tankers (47 units), with a smaller contribution from containers and gas carriers, resulting in a stronger profile compared with its newbuilding focus.

Vietnam follows at a distance, with 33 vessels, largely concentrated in dry bulk, indicating a narrower sectoral footprint in secondhand acquisitions.

Turkey records 33 vessels, with activity spread across dry bulk and tankers, while Singapore rounds out the top five with 27 vessels, showing limited but diversified participation across segments.

SECTION III: Shadow Fleet Dependence Remains Elevated Across Sanctioned Oil Exporters

Recent sanctions and enforcement efforts have focused mainly on maritime logistics instead of production, raising operational challenges but not significantly disrupting seaborne oil exports. Continued access to shadow fleet tanker capacity has been key to maintaining export flows, though it has led to greater logistical complexity, higher compliance risks, and increased operational costs.

Iran

During December, the United States announced additional sanctions targeting vessels, shipping companies, and intermediaries involved in the transportation of Iranian crude and petroleum products. These designations focused on maritime actors accused of facilitating exports through non-transparent ownership structures, flag-of-convenience registrations, and ship-to-ship transfer practices.

U.S. authorities stated that the measures were intended to disrupt Iran’s export logistics and shipping networks rather than upstream oil production. Many of the newly sanctioned vessels were described as operating largely outside Western insurance, IACS classification, and standard compliance frameworks.

Despite the expanded sanctions, publicly available shipping data and trade monitoring continued to indicate ongoing Iranian crude exports during the month. These flows were largely carried by non-compliant or lightly regulated tanker tonnage, with routing patterns broadly consistent with those observed earlier in the year.

No official announcements during December indicated a material collapse in Iran’s seaborne export volumes.

Venezuela

In December, U.S. authorities confirmed enforcement actions against tankers linked to Venezuelan oil exports, citing violations of existing U.S. sanctions. These actions included vessel detentions and legal measures against ships alleged to be transporting Venezuelan crude without authorization.

U.S. officials characterized the measures as enforcement of existing sanctions rather than the introduction of new legal authorities. The actions represented a more visible use of maritime enforcement tools compared with some earlier periods, when compliance efforts were more heavily focused on financial and administrative restrictions.

Venezuelan government officials publicly condemned the actions, describing them as unlawful and politically motivated. During the same period, Venezuelan authorities signaled increased naval monitoring of export movements, though no independent confirmation was available regarding the scope or effectiveness of any escort activity.

Export activity from Venezuela continued during December, though shipping data and trade reporting pointed to logistical challenges, including reported delays in loadings and indications of increased reliance on offshore storage.

Russia

For Russian oil, December saw further expansion of European Union sanctions targeting vessels associated with the transportation of crude and refined products outside the G7 price-cap framework. The EU formally added additional tankers to its sanctions lists, citing involvement in circumvention practices.

In parallel, the EU and partner countries-imposed sanctions on certain shipping companies and individuals accused of facilitating or managing non-compliant tanker operations linked to Russian exports. These measures focused on the commercial, managerial, and ownership structures supporting shadow fleet activity.

Despite the broadened sanctions, Russian oil exports continued during December, supported by tanker fleets operating outside Western insurance and financing systems. Trade monitoring indicated that exports continued to reach key destination markets, often via indirect routing and alternative service providers.

Separately, maritime security agencies and insurers continued to highlight elevated operational and safety risks associated with older and lightly regulated vessels engaged in sanctioned trades. However, no official findings during December concluded that these risks had materially reduced Russia’s overall export capability.

Venezuelan government officials publicly condemned the actions, describing them as unlawful and politically motivated. During the same period, Venezuelan authorities signaled increased naval monitoring of export movements, though no independent confirmation was available regarding the scope or effectiveness of any escort activity.

Export activity from Venezuela continued during December, though shipping data and trade reporting pointed to logistical challenges, including reported delays in loadings and indications of increased reliance on offshore storage.

Russia

For Russian oil, December saw further expansion of European Union sanctions targeting vessels associated with the transportation of crude and refined products outside the G7 price-cap framework. The EU formally added additional tankers to its sanctions lists, citing involvement in circumvention practices.

In parallel, the EU and partner countries-imposed sanctions on certain shipping companies and individuals accused of facilitating or managing non-compliant tanker operations linked to Russian exports. These measures focused on the commercial, managerial, and ownership structures supporting shadow fleet activity.

Despite the broadened sanctions, Russian oil exports continued during December, supported by tanker fleets operating outside Western insurance and financing systems. Trade monitoring indicated that exports continued to reach key destination markets, often via indirect routing and alternative service providers.

Separately, maritime security agencies and insurers continued to highlight elevated operational and safety risks associated with older and lightly regulated vessels engaged in sanctioned trades. However, no official findings during December concluded that these risks had materially reduced Russia’s overall export capability.